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This paper reviews current levels of identify fraud and then addresses a key component in the efforts to combat this fraud, 
that is authentication.  Two key problems exist with authentication. First, authentication systems treat identity as a localized 
entity when it is actually a distributed concept. Stolen identifiers are not detected because repudiating data for the real person 
is not locally available. Second, authentication systems use identifying information that is prone to theft. Password, token 
cards and PIN numbers can be stolen whereas retinal and handwriting patterns cannot readily be “lifted.”  We therefore 
propose that the solution to identify theft involves combining multiple identification methods, some with biometric measures. 
We describe our research in progress using keystrokes dynamics to identify the typist, perhaps of a personal identification 
number. Previous work uses time latencies.  We are proposing incorporating both time and pressure measures to give us more 
discriminative and resilient identification. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Identity theft involves  “stealing of another person’s personal identifying information such as Social Security number, date of 
birth and mother’s maiden name, and then using the information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt or take over 
existing financial accounts”(General Accounts Office USA, 2002). Identity theft has been the leading fraud in the USA for 
the third year in a row (Federal Trade Commission USA, 2004). More than twenty seven million American have been victims 
of identity theft in the last five years with an average loss of $4,800 from new accounts opened using other’s personal 
information or from the misuse of existing bank and credit accounts (Synovate, 2003). This adds up to a loss of $50 billion 
for 2002. The loss has not leveled out but continues to increase.  The time wasted by the victims to resolve the problems 
created by the misuse of their personal information and restore their credit worthiness was approximated to be 300 million 
hours.  Even higher is the cost to the business community. The identity theft resource center approximates that the losses 
suffered by the business communities are about $279 billion dollars without considering recovery expenditures (Identity 
Theft Resource Center Inc., 2003). The identity theft problem is global and threatens many nations. In the United Kingdom, 
identity theft was estimated to cost more than 1.4 billion British pounds as early as the year 2000 and has been increasing at a 
rate of 54% per annum since then (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2002).  
EXECUTION OF IDENTITY FRAUD  
The most common examples of identity fraud include credit card, check, bank debit, telephone card and social benefits fraud 
(Federal Trade Commission USA, 2004). A closer look at the different types of identity fraud shows that the domains of 
application are different, but the criminal methods used are similar. In all cases, the offender either open new accounts using 
stolen documents (true application fraud) or takes over existing victim’s accounts (account takeover fraud). Identity fraud is 
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both an online and offline problem. Recent trends indicate that online fraud is becoming the more dominant fraud having 
moved from 42% in year 2001 to 55% of total fraud in year 2003 (General Accounts Office USA, 2002).  These statistics 
have not separated out online identify theft.  However, this same document notes that identify fraud forms 42% of all fraud 
both online and offline, so we can likely assume that online identify theft is a growing online problem especially considering 
the large number of financial transactions that are now done online.  We posit that most identity thieves would like to avoid 
appearing physically at a primary financial institution where a teller can use an account holder’s picture, signature or other 
recorded behavioral cues to detect fraud. A thief would rather shop online or make monetary transfers online. Thus the 
Internet offers a better alternative with less potential of being caught.  In fact a thief need not reside in the country where the 
theft is being performed.  Although there are many reasons why identify fraud is on the rise, a pertinent issue in managing 
this problem is one of catching the identity thief prior to the theft. Improving our authentication technology can do this. 
PROBLEMS WITH AUTHENTICATION  
Two key problems exist with current authentication systems.  The first of these is the localization of the identification system.  
Identities are often easily copied because their verification data is local, e.g., it is easy for thieves to order credit cards in 
someone else’s name, change their address, and use that person’s good credit history because there is a lack of cross checking 
of house sales, tax records and vehicle registrations.  We will not address this issue further in this paper. A second key 
problem with current authentication technology is that they are mostly token-based (e.g., a bankcard) or knowledge-based 
(passwords or PIN numbers).  Magnetic cards can be easily scanned and counterfeited. Smart cards have higher data carrying 
capacities and are harder to counterfeit, but they can be broken using ionizing or microwave radiation (Smith, 1999). A 
diligent thief can readily find personal knowledge, often through web searches.  Humans have a predilection to generate 
passwords that are easy to remember.  Unfortunately, these passwords are also easy to crack. If they are difficult to 
remember, the user invariably writes them down where they can be stolen. Online data is vulnerable if users are not adept at 
maintaining firewalls and engaging in other security measures.  A solution to this problem is to use “identities “that cannot be 
stolen or separated from the owner. This can be achieved by combining the current identifiers with biometric methods.  
COMBINING CURRENT IDENTIFIERS WITH BIOMETRIC METHODS 
The performance of any biometric system is measured using both the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate  
(FAR). FAR is the “probability for an unauthorized user or a user who does not exist within the biometric systems to be 
falsely recognized as the legally registered user.”  FRR “is the probability of the legally registered user to be falsely rejected 
by the biometric system when presenting his or her biometric feature” (Graeventiz, 2003). Unfortunately, reducing FAR 
increases the FRR, which frustrates the genuine user who keeps getting rejected. A compromise is required. Good biometric 
authentication systems should behave as follows (Polemi, 1990): 
 
Operation: They should be easy and convenient to use with minimum time for enrollment, identification, and verification. 
Technical: The device should be of reasonable size. It should be rugged and stable. It should be accurate with error rates 
within acceptable low levels. 
Financial: The cost used to buy, install and maintain should be reasonable. 
Manufacturing: The chosen biometric systems should be standardized and supported by the mainstream manufacturers. It 
should also be interoperable with current computer hardware and software.  
Connectivity: We added the requirement that the authentication method should work online and offline. 
 
We used the above criteria to compare existing physiological and behavioral biometric methods, namely the fingerprint 
verification, retina scan, iris scan, face recognition, hand geometry, speech analysis, handwritten signature verification and 
keystroke analysis methods. The finger print method is very accurate although associated with criminality by some people. 
The iris recognition method is very accurate, but has acceptance problems. The facial analysis method works well but is 
sensitive to facial angles and lighting. The hand geometry method is accurate and well accepted, but expensive. The hand 
written signature verification is also highly acceptable but not as accurate  (Polemi, 1990). All of these methods are hard to 
implement in online systems. Speech analysis is mostly appropriate for voice-based systems. We conclude that the keystroke 
dynamic method has the potential of being most appropriate for our needs. This method is simple, cheap, convenient and 
transparent to the user.  Keyboards are also commonly available and need not be online to be used.  In the next section, we 
discuss work that has already been done on keystroke biometric measures and then present our plans for extending this work. 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KEYSTROKES DYNAMIC METHOD 
It is believed that each user of a keyboard generates a completely unique typing pattern. Thus, the “latencies between 
successive keystrokes, keystrokes’ durations, finger placement and applied pressure on the keys can be used to construct a 
unique user signature/profile” (Monrose and Rubin, 2000). Gaines et al. (1980) measured keystroke latency times for a 
Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004  4420
Ngugi et al  Fighting Identity Fraud with the Addition of Biometric Techniques 
succession of keystrokes from seven secretaries typing three passages of text. They were able to identify each secretary 
reliably (FAR= 0 %, FRR=4 %). Leggett et al. (1989) extended Gaines work to include more subjects and longer text 
(FAR=5 %, FRR=5.5). Mahar et al. (1995) improved this work with better outlier detection and the elimination of pooled 
variance. Garcia (1986) patented a method that uses mean latencies to form an electronic signature but did not report FAR 
and FRR statistics. Young and Hammon (1989) patented another method, which describes using time and pressure, but the 
implementation details are very scanty. Joyce and Gupta (1990) integrated the existing works to come up with a simple but 
elegant classifier using key digraphs (FAR=0.25 % FRR= 16.7%). Monrose and Rubin (2000) improved the sample 
replacement methodology used by Joyce and Gupta and obtained identification rates of 83.2%, 85.6 % and 87.2 % with the 
Euclidean, non-weighted and weighted Bayesian classifiers respectively. Ord and Furnelli (2000) used a neural network 
approach to develop a keypad authentication system (FAR= 9.9% FRR= 30%). Obaidat and Sadoun (1997) computed 
digraph similarities using k-means, cosine, minimum distance, Bayesian and potential function algorithms with the inter-key 
times, key hold times and their combination. The best identification accuracy of 100% was achieved using combined hold 
and inter-key time using a fuzzy network solution. Bleha et al. (1990) used a Bayesian minimum distance classifier (FRR= 
8.1%, FAR= 2.8%). Bergadano et al. (2002) suggested a new method that measures the degree of disorder between two typed 
samples with authentication occurring only if the distance between the two samples is below a certain threshold (FAR = 4%, 
FRR = 0.01%). All of the above studies use time latencies. Like Young and Hammon, we propose that adding pressure 
patterns to the time latencies will give more discriminative and resilient identification.  The next section describes our plans 
to implement this proposal. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH   
We are currently running a set of experiments using a representative sample of keyboard users.  Each user is given the task of 
typing a four-digit number into a computer.  They are trained on typing in this number until their time performance scores 
indicate that their learning curve has asymptoted.  We collect data from each subject using a pressure-sensitive keyboard, we 
have implemented. We have developed a driver to sample data from this keyboard and software to extract a file of pressure 
readings. Our next step is to model these pressure readings using wavelets analysis in order to obtain the best discriminating 
wavelet coefficients between a set of keystroke patterns generated by a group of volunteers.  We will then apply neural net 
learning algorithms to the data until we obtain the best discrimination.  This next step is underway and we have been able to 
achieve discrimination between four pilot users.  Once we feel that we have developed a set of viable coefficients, we will 
use Bayesian modeling to combine the pressure patterns with the time patterns generated by our subjects to determine if the 
combination of the two patterns are even more robust in lowering our FAR and FRR rates. 
 
Once we obtain a good set of discriminating algorithms, we will run more subjects on the keyboard using a variety of four-
digit numbers, a variety of keying environments and a wider range of subject types.  The focus of this research will be on 
determining how robust our authentication methods are under a wide range of typical conditions.  Once this effort is 
completed, we will then combine our time-pressure biometric method with the more traditional methods (e.g., pin number) to 
ascertain whether this combined approach can reliably identify a person as the “true” person. 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper reviews and synthesizes the current efforts going on in the fight against identity fraud. We identify some of the 
pertinent issues that need to be addressed. We propose a biometric measurement solution to the issue of inadequate 
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